CORPORATE PROFITS AND THE RISK OF ENTRY
Robert J. Stonebraker* ECONOMISTS have recently begun to assess the quantitative effect of risk on corporate rates of return. Several studies have analyzed the relation between the profitability of large firms and the amounts of risk faced by large firms.' But none has yet considered that the profitability of large firms might be related to the amounts of risk faced by smaller, fringe firms within their respective industries.
Most entry occurs on a small scale and entrepreneurs are likely to estimate the risk of entering an industry on the basis of the performance of existing small firms. If these small firms fail or are unable to consistently earn a normal rate of return, potential competitors may regard entry as "risky." The greater is this risk, ceteris paribus, the less likely new firms will be to enter. In this sense, the risk faced by small firms acts as an entry barrier enabling large firms to earn excess profits without attracting new competitors.
Alternatively, risk can be thought of as the vehicle through which entry barriers work. For example, where significant scale economies exist, the risk of entering the industry is likely to be high and, therefore, excess profits of existing large firms will be protected from new competition. Many of the characteristics that traditionally have been termed entry barriers can be interpreted as factors increasing the amount of risk faced by potential competitors. Section I of this paper develops a measure of "entry risk" and section II incorporates it into a simple theoretical model of large-firm profit rates. Section III discusses the construction of variables and the selection of data for empirical estimation of the model, and section IV presents the statistical results. Finally, in section V, a model explaining entry risk on the basis of such conventional entry barriers as economies of scale, advertising, and research and development expenditures is developed and tested. The conclusions and implications of the study are summarized in section VI.
I. A Measure of Entry Risk
The risk of entering an industry has two dimensions: the probability of earning less than the competitive return (or of taking an economic loss), and the size of such possible losses. If there is no chance of earning less than a competitive return, there is no "risk" to deter a firm from entering the industry.2 The more likely it is that a firm will earn less than the competitive return, or the larger is the average size of possible losses, the riskier is the firm's probability distribution of earnings.
Given a profit distribution with m possible 
Note that only those outcomes with irj below the competitive return are used to compute risk. Outcomes greater than or equal to i1r drop out when the expected value is taken. The ij are points of a probability distribution and cannot be observed directly. Since most firms enter on a small scale, either by buying out or merging with existing small firms, or by building a completely new facility, new firms are likely to base their risk calculations on the performance of existing small firms. If so, the ex post earnings distributions of small firms in an industry can be used to approximate the ex ante distribution as perceived by potential entrants.4
In this case each vij can be interpreted as a single observation of probability 1/m. The risk function can be rewritten as Risk then is the probability of earning a return below ir* (based on the profit performance of existing small firms), multiplied by the average distance below ir* of all such outcomes. In empirical testing, this small-firm risk measure should be supplemented with a measure of the chance of failure or bankruptcy. Since possible failure is a severe problem for small firms, and since firms which fail are necessarily missing from any data set, the performance of existing small firms may not accurately represent the true risk of entry.5
II. The Model
The hypothesis is that entry risk acts as an entry barrier enabling large firms to maintain excess profits. Thus, the average profitability of large firms in the jth industry (LFPj) should be positively related to the risk of entering that industry (ER1). The risk of entering should in turn be a function of the risk faced by existing small firms (SRj) and the chance of failure (Fj). This gives LFPj -g, (ERj)
ERj g2(SRj,Fj).
Substitution yields
where OLFP/9SRj > 0, OLFPj/0Fj > 0.
In the long run, risk and return should be positively related. Large firms in an industry should not be able to maintain higher-thanaverage profits over time unless the risk of entering the industry is also high. In the short run such firms might earn high profits given the level of entry risk in their industry, but in the long run any advantage should be erased by new entry or growth.
Adding a measure of the rate of growth of the jth industry (C,) to account for some of the short-run disequilibrium effects, the model becomes LFPj _ f (SRj, Fj, Gj) ,
or, in linear form LFPj=a+bSRj+cFj+dGj.
The coefficients on all three independent variables should be positive. The greater is the risk of entry or the industry growth rate, the greater should be the rate of return for large firms in the industry. With this model, risk is the only deterrent to new competition in industries with firms earning excess profits. Risk acts as an entry barrier. More precisely, it acts as a composite of entry barriers since a rise in any of them should increase the risk of entering the industry. In fact, entry barriers can be thought of as characteristics (either structural or behavioral) that increase the amount of risk faced by small or entering firms above that faced by dominant 4 For a critical assessment of procedures which estimate ex ante distributions on the basis of ex post data, see Morton (1969) . A referee has pointed out the possibility that large firms might be sheltering existing small firms via umbrella pricing. If so, the earnings performance of the established small firms will probably understate the amount of risk faced by new ontrants. 5 A second reason for including such a measure is that this study only includes data for firms listed in Moody's Industrial Manuals. Since Moody's does not list the smallest firms in each industry, the risk of the smallest samplefirms may not exactly represent the risk of the smaller firms not in the sample. Adding a measure of failure rates should help to correct any bias arising from the exclusion of these firms. firms for a given expected return.6 Unless scale economies, cost advantages, product differentiation, and capital requirements' increase this entry risk, they are not in any real sense "barriers" to entry.
Describing entry barriers in terms of risk has two major benefits. In the first place, the entry barrier literature has been written primarily in terms of the cost advantages enjoyed by dominant firms in an industry.8 But it is not the cost differences per se that are important. Once an entering firm achieves a particular scale or amount of consumer acceptance, most, if not all, of the cost differences are dissipated. The crucial question is whether or not entrants have a reasonable chance to attain the stature necessary for success.
Entry is a dynamic process. If a firm expects to be able to successfully break into a particular industry after a period of only one or two years, it might well enter even if the initial cost disadvantage is large. Although the chance of success (or risk) will almost certainly be correlated with the size of the initial cost disadvantage, a risk measure based on the performance record of past and present small firms in an industry should be a better indicator of the "barrier to entry" than the more conventional measures.
Secondly, the risk concept is more comprehensive than the traditional measures of entry barriers. If, for example, there exists the threat of predatory retaliation, entry into an industry might be deterred even if no other barriers are present.9 The effects of this and other behavioral barriers that could not otherwise be measured should be captured by the risk measure. Reliable data on failure rates are not available.'3 However, Marcus has shown that indusThis could alternatively be expressed as anything that lowers the expected return for a given level of risk. Note that small existing firms are included in the definition. Large-firm advantages can be just as effective in holding small existing firms in check as they can be in prohibiting new entry. For an excellent discussion of how such competitively disadvantaged firms can survive, see Bain (1969 High profit rates are clearly associated with a high risk of entry. The results are strong evidence that risk is an important deterrent to entry which enables established firms to earn supranormal profits. The higher is the risk of entry (as measured by the risk faced by small firms and by the failure-rate dummy), the higher is the profit level an industry can maintain without attracting new competitors.
III. The Data
The explanatory power of the model is particularly impressive given that the data are cross-sectional. More than 60%o of the differences in interindustry profit rates can be attributed to differences in growth rates and entry risk. Table 2 
V. Determinants of Entry Risk
The risk of entering an industry should depend upon the height of entry barriers. In particular, where behavioral barriers such as advertising or research and development are important, or where structural barriers such as economies of scale in production or absolute firm size are large, the risk of entry should be great. '7 Increases in advertising expenditures by large firms should increase the risk of entry as long as advertising can induce consumers to switch from one firm's product to another's. If entering firms match the increase in advertising expenditures on a proportional basis, their costs will rise, their expected profits will fall, and the risk of entry will increase." If entrants do not match the increased advertising expenditures, they are likely to lose sales and profits, again increasing the entry risk. If economies of scale exist in advertising, the advantage of large firms will be enhanced and the risk of entry will be correspondingly greater.'9
Advertising should be most effective in industries whose products are differentiable (at least in the minds of consumers) and are sold directly to individual consumers. In general, consumers are less informed about the differences (or lack of differences) between various brands than are corporate buyers and are therefore more susceptible to advertising claims. Even where buyer information is available, individual consumers are more apt to be swayed by advertising-induced appeals to personality factors than are corporate buyers.
Rapid technological change might also increase entry risk. In many industries, a firm's competitive position depends on its ability to keep up with a steady stream of innovations, many of which are protected by patents. If the dominant firms in an industry increase their research and development outlays, their chance of finding new products or processes to give them a competitive advantage increases. This in turn increases the chance that small firms will perform poorly and increases the risks faced by potential entrants.20
The amount of risk facing small and entering firms should depend on structural characteristics of the industry as well as behavioral characteristics. Where production economies of scale or absolute capital requirements are important, entry risk is likely to be high. If an entering firm must produce a substantial percentage of industry output to reach minimum efficient size, the probability of successful entry will be small. Similarly, if the minimum efficient plant size is large in absolute terms, new firms will have difficulty in obtaining the capital necessary for them to have a reasonable chance of success.
In functional form:
ERj= f(ADVj,RESj, ESj, MEPj)
where ERj is the risk of entering the jth indus-16 Several different measures, including piofit variance and loss-function measures, were tried. In no case was there a significant positive relationship -between the profitability of large firms and the risks faced by large firms. See Stonebraker (1973) . 17The distinction between structural and behavioral characteristics is not always clear. For example, "structural" economies of scale in the production of automobiles are at least partially the result of the "behavioral" decision to produce annual model changes (see Snell, 1971 The results suggest that entry risk does depend upon the height of entry barriers, but that the "behavioral" barriers of advertising and R&D are far more important than are the "structural" barriers of production scale economies and absolute size. In this respect, advertising and research have anticompetitive effects. Whatever benefits accrue from these activities in the form of increased consumer awareness or technological progress accrue at a cost: an increased risk of entry and a misallocation of resources as evidenced by higher large-firm profits.27
VI. Conclusions
This paper has developed and tested a model explaining differences in interindustry largefirm profits on the basis of differences in the risk of entry. The risk acts as an entry barrier. In fact, it is the mechanism through which traditional entry barriers operate. Where such barriers exist, the risk of entry should be high. This discourages entry by raising costs (in utility terms) for entering firms above those prevailing in successful established firms. Successful firms are thereby insulated from new competition and can maintain excess profits in the long run.
The empirical results are consistent with the above hypothesis. Entry risk is positively and significantly related to large-firm profits. The level of entry risk can in turn be explained by behavioral entry barriers such as advertising and research and development and, to a lesser extent, structural barriers such as economies of scale in production.
The implications are important. Large firms earn excess profits not because they themselves are risky, but because small firms within their industries are risky. Such profits are extessive in that they cannot be justified as necessary compensation for assuming unusually high levels of risk and, therefore, should not be automatically immune from antitrust prosecution. result in severe multicollinearity. The entry risk variable does retain its statistical significance in such equations, but this is of little consequence in light of the multicollinearity. 27 Given that entry risk insulates large firms from new competition, it is quite possible that advertising and R&D expenditures by large firms are at least partially motivated by a deliberate and conscious strategy to "manufacture" risk. Such strategies would be profitable whenever the gains from deterring competition exceed the net marginal cost of the expenditures.
